See the introductory post, New Upcoming Project: Refutation of William Whitaker's Disputation on Holy Scripture on Sola Scriptura.
I am utilizing a copy of the book available at Internet Archive.
Whitaker's words will be in blue. Page numbers will correspond to the above book version.
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The third place of the new Testament cited by the Jesuit is Matth. xxiii. 2. The words are these: "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all, therefore, that they command you to observe, that observe and do." Therefore, says the Jesuit, if they must be obeyed who sit in the chair of Moses, much more they who sit in the chair of Peter. I answer: To sit in Moses' seat is to succeed Moses as teacher; for by the seat of Moses is understood the doctrine delivered by Moses and the function of teaching. In this chair of Moses the scribes and Pharisees sat, and taught some things legitimately and correctly. (p. 426)
In the last installment, we saw how Whitaker denied that Moses had any successors (being an extraordinary prophet); thus that his role as a settler of disputes was not passed on, and was irrelevant to the analogy of scriptural interpretation in the New Covenant. I replied that he was unique in important respects; yet in his teaching function and as leader of the Hebrews, he was not unique, and could have successors (and proceeded to show how the Bible expressly states that Joshua was commissioned by Moses himself as his successor.
Now Whitaker freely grants exactly what I argued against him last time. Some people are slow learners. If Whitaker can find it in his heart to reverse himself in the space of a few pages, who am I to refrain from giving him credit where it is due? He arrived at the truth. It just took a while . . .
They were to be heard, therefore, yet not in all, but then only when they taught according to the law, and when they followed Moses in their teaching, not in whatsoever simply they commanded. For then Christ would have contradicted himself; since, in the 6th and 7th chapters of Matthew, he refutes their false interpretations, and wholly sets aside certain dogmas introduced by them into the church contrary to the true sense of the law. (p. 426)
Now Whitaker argues as he did regarding Moses and his successors: they are to be obeyed only when they teach according to the law, which is actually determined by each individual, since, after all, they are expected to have some innate ability to correct their own teachers and a reserved right, therefore, to reject the teachers and rebel against them -- which is "pure Luther" when one ponders it: defying the entire Church because he is convinced he is right and the Church and all of previous dogmatic history wrong, where they differ.
There was no justification for disobedience in the Old Testament texts (as I noted) and there is none here. Jesus already observed in the same passage where He upholds their authority, that they were often hypocrites; hence He states, "observe whatever they tell you, but not what they do; for they preach, but do not practice" (Matt 23:3). In other words, "follow the teaching, but not their inadequate and hypocritical observance of it."
The same dynamic holds in Whitaker's supposed counter-examples of Matthew 6 and 7. Jesus is still talking about hypocrisy, and not false teaching, whereas Whitaker falsely spins this as "false interpretations" and "dogmas." Matthew 6:1-8 is a denunciation of the hypocrisy of an outward display of prideful piety, regarding alms and prayers, with "hypocrites" mentioned in 6:2 and 6:5.
After the Lord's Prayer, Jesus resumes His condemnation of the hypocrisy of public display, regarding fasting (6:16-18). The rest of the chapter is a discourse on faith in God's provisions, and seems to not have anything directly to do with the Pharisees.
In Matthew 7, our Lord continues talking about spiritual hypocrisy, with the example of the speck in our neighbor's eye and the log in our own (7:1-5). This arguably still applies to certain Pharisees, but certainly not to dogma and "false interpretations." Hypocrisy (if it were applied to doctrine, which it is not in this case), would mean that the person didn't act or teach consistently with his own teaching -- not that he didn't hold the view in the first place. He goes on to discuss faith and God's generous provisions again.
Jesus refers to false prophets in 7:15, "who come to you in sheep's clothing," but this doesn't refer to the Pharisees. Rather, it is a reference to those falsely posing as Christian disciples of Jesus, since in 7:22 He portrays them as saying, "Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and do many mighty works in your name?" Compare this to the seventy disciples of Jesus casting out demons (Lk 10:17).
These were false prophets who appeared to be like other disciples, but were in fact "wolves." The Pharisees who rejected Jesus as Messiah would never had said that. They wouldn't have done anything in His name, and when they saw Him cast out demons, they said that "It is only by Be-el'zebul, the prince of demons, that this man casts out demons" (Matt 12:24).
The conclusion, then, is that Whitaker's counter-points, supposedly exhibited in Matthew 6 and 7 fail entirely, and are no refutation of the Pharisees' teaching authority that Jesus upheld in Matthew 23. Indeed, Christ didn't contradict Himself, but it is Whitaker who does so, and who misinterprets the teaching of our Lord in his desperate zeal to refute the "papists" at any cost. Not only did Jesus uphold their authority; He observed their ritualistic and religious customs as well, and Paul called himself a Pharisee three times (Acts 23:6; 26:5; Phil 3:5), after becoming a Christian.
The sixth place which the Jesuit objects out of the new Testament is contained in Acts xv. 5, 6, 7, 28; where, upon a question arising about the law of Moses and circumcision, the Christians who disputed amongst themselves, are not remitted (says the Jesuit) to a private spirit, but to a christian council over which Peter pre- sided, which came to this conclusion, ver. 28: "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," and c. Hence the Jesuit gathers, that the Holy Spirit is always present in a council where Peter or Peter's successors preside. . . . Let the same thing, if possible, be now done as was done here. Let the pastors and bishops be gathered together to consider and define some question not by their own judgment, but by the authority of the Holy Spirit speaking in the scriptures. For thus they defined that controversy out of the scriptures, that we might understand that the supreme judgment is to be given to the scriptures. Nor was there anything there concluded but by the authority of scripture. (pp.431-432)
I have already noted in a past installment, that the opposite was true of this council, at least as far as we can determine from the record we have of it in Scripture. We know that the main issue in contention was whether Gentiles had to be circumcised (Acts 15:1-2, 5). When St. Peter spoke, he mentioned no Scripture (15:7-11). St. Paul and Barnabas also talked not about Scripture, but about "signs and wonders" in their missionary experiences (15:12). Then when St. James spoke, he did cite Scripture, but it was not about circumcision in particular; rather it was a general statement of the Gentiles being included in the kingdom, by God's will (15:13-21). This is the only Scripture we hear of. St. Paul and St. Peter are not recorded as having mentioned anything in the Bible at all.
Yet, oddly enough, Whitaker's sophistical take is that "they defined that controversy out of the scriptures, that we might understand that the supreme judgment is to be given to the scriptures." No such thing occurs in Acts 15! This notion is merely read into the text, and is a false representation of what occurred (i.e., as far as we know from the account), and Whitaker also utters falsehood when he writes, "Nor was there anything there concluded but by the authority of scripture." It's simply not true. Even if it were true (reading in-between the lines and speculating), this could not be concluded from the inspired biblical account passed down to us.
Thirdly, I confess, that the Holy Ghost was present and presided in this council, and that this sentence was that of the Holy Ghost, since it is proved by the testimony of scripture. (p. 432)
The problem is that we have just shown that the council was not undertaken with a "sola Scriptura outlook" at all. It is almost pure Church authority.
We confess that all have not the gift of publicly interpreting the scriptures; but in private all the faithful, taught by the Holy Ghost, can understand the scriptures and recognise the true sense of scripture. (p. 433)
Again, falling back on the pure subjectivism of "me, my Bible, and the Holy Spirit" does not solve the difficulty in the Protestant position (especially this variant held by Whitaker) at all; nor prove that sola Scriptura is taught in Scripture. It is sheer circular reasoning. I agree with a dead-on insight that "Adomnan": a regular on my blog, expressed in the combox of part 10 of this series:
Whitaker's theory of biblical interpretation can be summed up in a nutshell: "I don't pretend to interpret the Bible on my own. Rather, the Holy Spirit interprets it for me. And how do I recognize the Holy Spirit's interpretation? Well, because it agrees with mine!"
Also, Whitaker's "external persuasion" of the meaning of scripture is useless given his belief in "fully assured" understanding granted internally by the Holy Spirit.
He writes: "We must be illuminated by the Holy Spirit to be certainly persuaded of the true sense of scripture; otherwise, although we use all means, we can never attain to that full assurance which resides in the minds of the faithful. But this is only an internal persuasion, and concerns only ourselves."
Yet he goes on to talk about an "external persuasion" and "judgment of scripture" meant to "persuade others." This is pointless, given his assumptions. If these others are illuminated by the Holy Spirit as Whitaker claims to be, then they will agree with his "fully assured" interpretations. If they lack this illumination, then no amount of external persuasion, as Whitaker himself admits, will impart the correct understanding to them. So, "external persuasion" has no real function in Whitaker's system (which, incidentally, makes all expository sermons futile, as well as this Disputation).
One can see how Whitaker's radical individualism led rather quickly to the Quakers' "Inner Light." The Quakers, however, were more consistent. They regarded sermons explicating scripture as so much blather. Better to sit quiet until the Holy Spirit provided you with some insight you could blurt out.
The ninth and last place, which the Jesuit adduces from the new Testament, is contained in 1 John iv. 1, where we are admonished "not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God:" therefore (says the Jesuit) a private spirit can not be the judge or interpreter of scripture, because it is to be judged itself. I answer: The Jesuit does not understand the state of the question. We do not say that each individual should acquiesce in that interpretation which his own private spirit frames and dictates to him; for this would be to open a door to fanatical tempers and spirits: but we say that that Spirit should be the judge, who speaks openly and expressly in the scriptures, and whom all may hear; by him we desire that all other spirits, that is, all doctrines, (for so the word is to be taken in this place,) should be examined. We recognise no public judge save scripture, and the Spirit teaching us in scripture: yet this man speaks as if we made the spirit within the judge of others; which should never be done. For we are not so mad or foolish as to deal thus: You ought to acquiesce in this doctrine, because my spirit judges it to be true; but we say, You should receive this doctrine because the Holy Spirit in the scriptures hath taught us thus to think and to believe. (pp. 433-434)
More subjective, viciously circular mush: so expertly demolished in the comment by Adomnan -- thus freeing me from the tedious, wearisome burden of having to dissect such obviously and profoundly illogical thought.
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